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Abstract
This paper introduces a nonlinear feedback trading model at high
frequency. All price adjustment is endogenous, driven by asset return
and volatility in the previous trading period. There is no stochastic
uncertainty or asymmetric information. The dynamics of expected
returns display stable or unstable behavior–including the possibility
of turbulence and chaos–as a function of market liquidity (inverse
price impact) and the concentration of investor beliefs, which is pro-
portional to the intensity of positive feedback. The results highlight
the complementary role of investor diversity and market liquidity in
maintaining financial stability.
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1 Introduction
Can feedback trading sustain positive expected returns on financial assets?
According to the weak form of the eﬃcient markets hypothesis (EMH), ex-
pected returns should be zero regardless of the trading frequency. The main
objective of this paper is to investigate the key premise of EMH in a nonlinear
(logistic) feedback trading model with no stochastic uncertainty. There are
two key trading parameters: asset liquidity, which is inversely related to the
price impact of net order flow, and the intensity of positive feedback trading,
which is inversely related to the diversity of investor opinion.
The intensity of high-frequency trading reflects the relative strength of
two feedback rules. First, investors display positive feedback, linked to
“momentum” trading strategies: they buy/sell the risky financial asset if
returns in the previous period were positive/negative. Second, investors
also exhibit risk feedback: their asset demand falls/rises following relatively
volatile/tranquil trading periods. Risk feedback amounts to a “buy low-sell
high” trading strategy in a mean-variance world where risk and expected
returns are positively related.
Positive feedback can destabilize financial markets while risk feedback
has a stabilizing influence. Thus, the interaction of the two types of feedback
matters for financial stability. I capture this interaction by assuming the
intensities of positive and risk feedback to be inversely related. There are
two possible justifications for this assumption. First, it is consistent with
the findings of Cohen and Shin (2003) on the high-frequency US Treasury
bond market. These authors report strong evidence of positive feedback in
high-frequency trading on US Treasury bonds: (a) returns tend to be more
positively autocorrelated when market conditions are more volatile; and (b)
price declines/rises elicit asset sales/purchases, and such feedback trading is
stronger in volatile market conditions. Arguably, this applies to positive feed-
back both during episodes of market euphoria–such as the dot.com bubble
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of 1999/2000–and during market turbulence. Risk feedback captures this
trading pattern: sales pressure is growing in the previous period’s volatility,
given the intensity of feedback trading. Second, Persaud (2001, 2003) argues
that momentum strategies may gather strength as investors’ beliefs become
more concentrated. Heterogeneity decreases during market euphoria as well
as during crises: in both cases, the market becomes one-sided and risk con-
siderations matter very little. To quote Alan Greenspan, during the Long
Term Capital Management liquidity crisis “...everyone wanted out” (October
7, 1998, quoted in Longstaﬀ (2004)). Thus, a useful way of capturing sharp
falls in the diversity of investor opinion is to assume the relative intensity of
momentum and risk feedback to be inversely related. In the sequel, I use the
terms heterogeneity / diversity and concentration / uniformity of investor
opinion interchangeably.
The main features of the model are as follows. At the start of each trading
period, the risk-neutral market maker receives the net order flow and adjusts
the asset price level from the previous period using a linear pricing rule.
The return dynamics generated by the two feedback trading rules follow a
quadratic logistic map which is parametric in asset liquidity and investor
diversity. In turn, the logistic map has two fixed points, one of which is
always zero and the other generically non-zero. If stable, the zero fixed point
corresponding to zero expected returns is consistent with EMH. Similarly,
if the non-zero fixed point is stable then it violates EMH. The fixed points’
relative stability depends on the size of the two trading parameters.
There are three main findings. First, the zero fixed point is dynamically
stable for suﬃciently diverse investor opinion (i.e. for suﬃciently low inten-
sity of positive feedback) and suﬃciently high asset liquidity (i.e., for suﬃ-
ciently small price impact coeﬃcients). For such combinations of the trading
parameters the non-zero fixed point is dynamically unstable. Importantly, if
investor diversity and/or asset liquidity decline, the relative stability of the
two fixed points is reversed. Now the zero fixed point becomes unstable while
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the non-zero fixed point is stable.
Further, the threshold level of investor diversity triggering the transition
to dynamic instability increases in the asset’s liquidity. Equivalently, the
threshold level of positive feedback intensity at which the transition occurs
is decreasing in asset liquidity. This property indicates that if liquidity is
already low, then a small decline in investor diversity–equivalently, a small
rise in positive feedback intensity–can destabilize the zero fixed point. In-
deed, if price impact coeﬃcient grows and asset liquidity falls below a certain
point, both fixed points become unstable for any level of investor diversity.
The dynamics of the logistic map then enter a range of period-doubling bi-
furcations. Eventually, as liquidity “dries up” equilibrium market dynamics
become completely unstable and chaos emerges. A deterministic nonlinear
dynamical system is chaotic if it is sensitively dependent on initial conditions
and produces random-looking dynamic paths.
The relative stability of the two fixed points also depends on the returns
distribution. If high-frequency returns are Gaussian, zero expected returns is
a stable equilibrium for all feasible values of the trading parameters. In turn,
non-Gaussian returns is a necessary, but not suﬃcient, condition for zero
expected returns to be unstable. It should be stressed that the dynamic pro-
gression from stable equilibrium to chaos is deterministic as it is completely
controlled by asset liquidity and investor diversity.
Second, the model yields several testable properties on short-term re-
turns persistence, proxied by the first-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient. The
benchmark implication of the Shiller (1984)-Sentana and Wadwani (1992)
framework is that higher conditional volatility unambiguously increases re-
turn autocorrelation, consistent with the asymmetric GARCHmodels of Nel-
son (1991) and Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993). By contrast, in
this paper persistence can take either sign depending on the interaction of
the two trading parameters with the second and third conditional moments
of returns. In particular, positive and risk feedback respectively introduce
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conditional volatility and skewness to the autocorrelation coeﬃcient.
In tranquil market conditions when skewness is negligible, autocorrela-
tion is always positive but independent of volatility, and its magnitude falls
with investor diversity (rises with positive feedback intensity). In order for
conditional volatility to aﬀect persistence the returns distribution has to be
asymmetric. Specifically, higher volatility induces more persistence (raising
positive or lowering negative autocorrelation) only if conditional skewness
is positive. That is more likely to be the case during financial bubbles as-
sociated with investor euphoria. Higher volatility induces less persistence
à la Shiller-Sentana-Wadwani only if conditional skewness is negative, such
as in the aftermath of a market crash. Moreover, the model predicts that
bigger average order flow–a reasonable proxy of trading volume–induces
more persistence if skewness is negative. Conversely, with positive skewness,
bigger average order flow actually lowers persistence, as found by Campbell,
Grossman and Wang (1993) for stock returns. These results suggest that
distributional asymmetries may contribute to short term returns persistence
over and above the current level of asset risk.
The paper combines research on non-fundamental-based investor behav-
ior, driven from behavioral finance (see Barberis and Thaler (2003)) with
research on the potential for instability and chaos arising from the interac-
tion of financial market participants, driven by work on nonlinear dynamics.
Recent applications of chaos to economics include Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2004), Brock et al. (1996), and Christiano and Harrison (1999).
Models where asset prices are driven by non-fundamentals can be traced to
Shiller (1984), Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990) and Sentana and Wad-
hwani (1992). In the Sentana-Wadhwani model, positive feedback traders in-
teract with smart-money traders, who trade based on expected fundamentals.
In contrast, I assume both trading rules are based on non-fundamentals.1
1On the relationship between heterogeneity of investor beliefs and speculative bubbles
see Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Shiller (2000).
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On the empirical front, there is strong evidence that liquidity is time-
varying especially during market stress; see Farmer et al. (2005). Liquidity
risk is being integrated in asset pricing models (Acharya and Pedersen (2004),
Cochrane (2001) and Engle and Lange (1997)) and financial risk management
(Bangia et al. (2002)). The direction of causation from signed order flow to
asset prices is well documented by Hasbrouck (1991) for the stock market
and Evans and Lyons (2002) for foreign exchange. On the reverse causation,
Watanabe (2002) finds that daily Japanese stock returns exhibit positive
autocorrelation when volatility is low and negative autocorrelation when it
is high. Also, returns tend to be more negatively autocorrelated after price
declines than after price rises. Kim and Wei (2001) use panel data to show
that Korean oﬀ-shore funds displayed less positive feedback than their on-
shore counterparts during the Asian crises of 1997-98. Finally, Bohl and
Siklos (2004) using daily stock index data report that feedback trading is
more pronounced in emerging than in mature financial markets.
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 presents the feedback trading
rules; Section 3 derives returns autocorrelation; Section 4 studies the exis-
tence and stability of equilibrium market dynamics as fixed points of a para-
metric logistic map; Section 5 classifies fixed point stability in terms of asset
liquidity (inverse price impact), investor diversity, and the conditional vari-
ance and skewness of returns; Section 6 shows that (non-) Gaussian returns
are a suﬃcient (necessary) condition for financial (in)stability, and highlights
the policy implications for financial regulators; and Section 7 concludes. All
fixed point definitions are in the Appendix.
2 Asset demand and order flow
All trading on the single risky asset is at high frequency, so time intervals
between trades are small but discretized; typically, sampling is at 5-minute
frequency or higher. Letting period t denote the interval between times t−1
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and t, the asset return in period t is rt ≡ ∆ logPt, where logPt is the log price
level at time t. By the weak form of the EMH, the conditional expectation of
returns h-periods-ahead is zero: Et−1rt+h = 0 for all h ≥ 0. When expected
returns are zero, actual and excess returns coincide. Defining excess returns
in period t as xt ≡ rt − Et−1rt implies rt = xt, σ2xt = var[rt] = Et−1x2t , and
sxt = skew[rt] = Et−1x
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t . Conditional variance and skewness then are the
second and third centered moment of xt.
Investors employ two feedback trading rules. Following positive feedback,
they buy/sell the risky asset in period t if they observe positive/negative
returns in t−1, a characteristic of momentum strategies. Following risk feed-
back, traders react to conditional volatility in period t− 1 by buying/selling
the asset at time t if they observe lower/higher volatility in period t − 1,
consistent with buy low-sell high strategies.
Relative asset demand is assumed to be diﬀerent for each rule. I de-
fine the intensity of positive and risk feedback trading to be f and 1 − f
respectively, where 0 ≤ f ≤ 1. The two trading rules have equal inten-
sity iﬀ f = 0.5.2 As argued in Section 1, the inverse relationship between
positive and risk feedback captures the time-varying diversity of investor
opinion. As investor diversity declines, positive feedback gathers momentum
and risk considerations matter relatively less. By contrast, with suﬃcient
heterogeneity of investor beliefs positive feedback becomes less intense and
risk considerations gain in importance.
Let the net order flow from positive feedback be ω+t = fγxt−1. The
constant feedback intensity f is decreasing in investor diversity (increasing
in the uniformity of investor opinion), and γ is a scalar mapping actual
returns in period t − 1 to asset units demanded at time t. The sign of
ω+t depends on last period’s return. In contrast, Sentana and Wadhwani
2Kim and Wei (2001) also model trading intensity, proxied by time-varying portfolio
weights on individual stocks. An alternative interpretation of trading intensity, motivated
from game theory, is that there are two types of trader in the market at any time, a
proportion f% of positive feedback and (1− f)% of risk feedback traders.
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(1992) allow both positive and negative feedback by assuming γ > 0 or
γ < 0, respectively. Similarly, let the net order flow from risk feedback be
ω−t = −(1− f)γx2t−1 < 0. In this case, the intensity of risk feedback trading
1 − f is increasing in investor diversity. Risk feedback corresponds to the
risk component of smart money traders (driven by mean-variance) in the
Shiller-Sentana-Wadwani framework. By generating less/more asset demand
as conditional volatility x2t−1 grows/declines, it acts as an automatic stabilizer
on the market.
The aggregate order flow to the market maker at time t is given by
ωt ≡ ω+t + ω−t = fγxt−1 − (1− f)γx2t−1 , (1)
where the sign of ωt depends on the previous period’s trend and risk–proxied
by the level and square of returns at t − 1–and the diversity of investor
opinion, captured by 1 − f . It follows that the expected net order flow for
period t is always negative
Et−1ωt = −λ(1− f)γσ2x < 0 (2)
At time t, the risk-neutral market maker receives ωt and adjusts the asset
price from period t− 1 to t using a linear pricing rule3
xt = rt = λ ωt, λ > 0 (3)
The price impact of a unit change in order flow measures market depth.
An asset’s liquidity is then proxied simply by inverse price impact, 1/λ.
Substituting equation (1) into (3) yields
xt = λfγxt−1 − λ(1− f)γx2t−1 (4)
As λ > 0 always, the risky asset’s return in period t is positive (negative) iﬀ
ωt > (<)0.
3Holden and Subrahmanyam (1996) list the full set of assumptions for the pricing rule
to be linear.
7
3 Short term returns persistence
As returns dependence is limited to adjacent time periods, the first autocor-
relation coeﬃcient of xt captures short term persistence. From equation (4),
the first autocovariance of xt+1 is
cov(xt+1, xt) = cov[λfγxt − λ(1− f)γx2t , xt]
= λfγσ2xt − λ(1− f)γsxt
σ2xt and sxt denote conditional volatility and skewness of returns at time t.
Dividing through by σ2xt yields the first-order autocorrelation
ρ1t(xt+1, xt) = λfγ − λ(1− f)γ
sxt
σ2xt
, (5)
where −1 ≤ ρ1t ≤ 1.4 Note that the first term is always positive and its
magnitude increases with f , the concentration of investor opinion. Therefore,
ρ1t = λfγ > 0 iﬀ sxt = 0. The second term is negative (positive) iﬀ sxt > 0
(sxt < 0). Higher volatility will then generate more positive, or less negative
autocorrelation: ∂ρ1t/∂σ
2
xt > 0 when sxt > 0.
This comparative static result diﬀers from Sentana andWadhwani (1992).
There, positive feedback dominates in periods of high volatility and gener-
ates negative autocorrelation, while negative feedback (γ < 0) prevails at low
volatility and induces positive autocorrelation. In this paper I rule out the
possibility of negative feedback to focus on the convenient analytical prop-
erties of the logistic map in Section 4. Also, note that ∂ρ1t/∂σ
2
xt > 0 when
sx > 0, consistent with Cohen and Shin’s (2003) finding that short term
persistence in the US Treasury bond market is stronger when volatility is
higher.
Short term persistence is constrained by requring that −1 ≤ ρ1t ≤ 1 in
equation (5). Expressed in terms of the concentration (uniformity) of investor
4Note that conditional kurtosis would also enter in expression (5) if conditional skewness
aﬀected trading decisions. For evidence of nonlinear dependence in stock returns see
LeBaron (1992) and Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997).
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investor opinion, proxied by f , the inequalities become
0 ≤ fL =
sxtλγ − σ2xt
λγ(sxt + σ2xt)
≤ f ≤ sxtλγ + σ
2
xt
λγ(sxt + σ2xt)
= fU ≤ 1 , (6)
where fL < fU for all σx 6= 0. Assuming that sxt + σ2xt > 0 to combine
conditional volatility with all positive and some negative skewness values
(sxt > −σ2xt) suggests fU ≤ 1 iﬀ λγ ≥ 1. The price impact coeﬃcient λ is
then bounded below by 1/γ. Similarly, fL ≥ 0 iﬀ sxtλγ ≥ σ2xt. Combining
the two inequalities yields
λ ≥ max{ σ
2
xt
sxtγ
,
1
γ
} ≥ 0
(7)
0 ≤ 1
λ
≤ min{sxtγ
σ2xt
, γ}
Inequalities (7) yield testable implications for the admissible range of asset
liquidity in terms of the second and third conditional moments of returns;
discussing these is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Equation (5) can also be used to assess the empirical finding of Camp-
bell, Grossman and Wang (1993) that stock returns persistence is negatively
related to trading volume. Proxying the latter by net order flow, substitute
equation (2) into (5)
ρ1t = λfγ − λ
£
(1− f)γσ2xt
¤ sxt
σ4xt
=
= λfγ − λsxt
σ4xt
[Et−1ωt] (8)
Hence, average order flow and autocorrelation are negatively related iﬀ skew-
ness is positive. In contrast, if skewness is negative then higher average order
flow actually contributes to short term returns persistence.
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4 Equilibrium expected returns
4.1 Fixed point existence
I propose solving first-order diﬀerence equation (4) as a parametric logistic
map hf,λ(·) from xt to xt+1
xt+1 = hf,λ(xt) ≡ pxt(1− qxt) (9)
p = fλγ > 0 , q =
1− f
f
> 0
Given γ > 0, logistic parameter p is monotonically decreasing in asset liq-
uidity 1/λ and investor diversity 1− f . In turn, logistic parameter q reflects
the feedback rules’ relative strength; ∂q/∂p > 0 and q = 1 iﬀ f = 0.5.
The logistic map has two fixed points, defined as x = hf,λ(xt) = xt+1
x1 = 0
x2 =
p− 1
pq
=
fλγ − 1
λγ(1− f) (10)
Note that f 6= 1 is required for x2 and q to be finite, so not all market activity
can be driven by positive feedback trading–some risk feedback must exist
at any time. Equations (10) also imply ∂x
2
∂λ
= 1
λ2γ(1−f) > 0 always, while
∂x2
∂f
= λγ−1
λγ(1−f)2 > 0 iﬀ λγ > 1. Further, check that
hf,λ
µ
1
q
=
f
1− f
¶
= x1 (11)
and
hf,λ
µ
1
pq
=
1
λγ(1− f)
¶
= x2 , (12)
so x10 = f
1−f > 0 and x
20 = 1
λγ(1−f) > 0 map onto fixed points x
1 and
x2, respectively after one iteration of h
f,λ
. The two eventually fixed points of
the logistic function are important in the classification of dynamic stability in
Section 5. Setting γ = 1, without loss of generality, Figure 1 below illustrates
the behavior of xt+1 = hf,λ(xt) for diﬀerent f and λ combinations.5 Fixed
points x1 and x2 lie at the intersections of hf,λ with the 45o line.
5The analysis can accommodate γ 6= 1 without changing the essence of the results.
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FIGURE 1 HERE
Clockwise from the top left, in Panel A investor diversity is set at 1−f =
0.8 and asset liquidity at λ = 1.6. In the population view of feedback trading,
20% of market participants are positive feedback traders and 80% are risk
feedback traders. For these trading parameters p = 0.60 and q = 1, hence
x2 = −0.53 and x20 = 0.78. In Panel B f = 0.5 and λ = 2, so 50% of
investors are positive feedback traders. Then p = q = 1 and the two fixed
points collapse to x1 = x2 = 0. In Panel C f = 0.1 and λ = 15, implying
p = 1.5 and x2 = 0.04. Lastly, in Panel D f = 0.2 and λ = 20, hence p = 4
and x2 = 0.19. Figure 1 indicates that the location of the non-zero fixed
point is sensitive to the trading parameters.
4.2 Fixed point stability
A fixed point is stable (unstable) if the absolute value of the slope of hf,λ at
that fixed point is smaller (greater) than one; see Appendix. At this point,
note that expected returns must be zero–defined as a stable zero fixed point
corresponding to Et−xt = 0–in order to be consistent with EMH. In other
words, asset returns must be (linearly) unpredictable at any forecast horizon.
It follows that fixed point x1 = 0 always satisfies Et−xt = 0. However, the
second fixed point is generically non-zero: x2 < (>)0 iﬀ p = fλγ < (>)1. It
thus violates Et−1xt = 0 unless p = 1.
To determine the range of asset liquidity and investor diversity such that
x1 is stable and x2 unstable, diﬀerentiate equation (9) with respect to x
h0f,λ(x) = p− 2pqx = fλγ − 2(1− f)λγx (13)
The absolute value of (13) at x1 and x2 is
| h0f,λ(x1 = 0) |=| fλγ |=| p | (14)
| h0f,λ(x2 6= 0) |=| 2− fλγ |=| 2− p | ,
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which depends only on p. Note that for γ = 1, any λ > 1 implies p > 1
for some 0 < f < 1. Equations (14) suggest that in order for | fλγ |< 1
the value of f cannot exceed 1/λγ given λ > 0–similarly, the price impact
measure cannot exceed 1/fγ given f ∈ (0, 1). Thus, for any level of asset
liquidity, a more diverse investor opinion has a stabilizing influence on the
zero fixed point while lower diversity is destabilizing, and vice versa for the
non-zero fixed point.
As h0f,λ is smoothly decreasing in x given λ and f , the solutions of |
h0f,λ(x) |= 1 constitute bounds for the stable range of either fixed point. The
bounds are
xmin =
fλγ − 1
2λγ(1− f) , x
max =
fλγ + 1
2λγ(1− f) (15)
Comparing (10) and (15) indicates xmin = x2/2. If x2 < 0 then xmin > x2 ,
so x2 is unstable. Conversely, if x2 > 0 then xmin < x2 and x2 is stable.
5 A taxonomy of fixed point dynamics
For notational convenience, I illustrate the route from stability to chaos
numerically in terms of f . Market dynamics change as positive feedback
intensity–growing in the concentration of investor opinion–and asset liq-
uidity aﬀect logistic parameter p. Fixing the liquidity parameter at 1/λ,
positive feedback intensity is increased from f = 0.001 to 0.999 in steps of
size 0.001. Starting at x0 = 0.00001, corresponding to zero expected returns,
Figure 2 below plots the evolution of the fixed point(s) of hf,λ(x) as f varies.
In Panels A, B and C the price impact coeﬃcient is respectively fixed at
λ = 4, 5 and 6
FIGURE 2 HERE
Figure 2 suggests the following taxonomy for the dynamic stability of
hf,λ(x) in terms of trading parameters λ and f :
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(i) When p ∈ (0, 1) clearly | fλγ |< 1 and | 2 − fλγ |> 1. Therefore,
x1 = 0 is a stable (attracting) fixed point while x2 6= 0 is unstable (repelling).
The stable set of x1 is the open interval bounded from below by x2, which is
negative, and from above by its eventually fixed point x20, which is positive:
W (x1) =
³
fλγ−1
λγ(1−f) ,
1
λγ(1−f)
´
. Then, paths of xt starting from any point
in W (x1) will converge to x1 after finitely many iterations of hf,λ(xt). In
contrast, the stable set of x2 includes only itself and x20, that is W (x2) =
{x2, x20}. Paths of xt at any point other than x2 or x20 will diverge to infinity
(the stable set of infnity is the remainder of the real line).
(ii) At p = 1, the absolute value of hf,λ at the fixed points equals one
(| h0f,λ(x1) |=| hf,λ(x2) |= 1) and the logistic map displays a transcritical
bifurcation. From (10), x1 = x2 = 0 and the two fixed points coincide as
shown in Figure 1, Panel B. The positive feedback intensity corresponding
to each value of λ constitutes a stability threshold. These are located at
fmin = 0.25, 0.20 and 0.17 when λ = 4, 5 and 6, and highlighted with dashed
vertical lines in Figure 2. The stable set of the single (zero) fixed point is
W (x = 0) = [0, x10].
(iii) When p ∈ (1, 3), | fλ |> 1 and 0 <| 2 − fλ |< 1 so the stability
properties are reversed. In this logistic parameter range, x1 becomes unstable
and x2 stable. The stable set of x1 contains only itself and its eventually
fixed point, W (x1) = {0, x10}, while the stable set of x2 is the open interval
W (x2) = (0, x20). In the range p ≥ 1 the stable set of infinity includes the
intervals (−∞, x1 = 0) and (x20,∞). Figure 2 clearly shows that the steady-
state path of xt exhibits a discontinuity at approximately f = 0.68, 0.55 and
0.47 in Panels A, B and C respectively. The jump from the unstable zero
fixed point to the stable non-zero fixed point is located at x2 = 1.38, 0.77
and 0.55% when λ = 4, 5 and 6. Note that the steady-state path encounters
the non-zero fixed point at p ' 2.74 and | h0f,λ(x2) |' 0.74 < 1 in all three
cases, so the dynamics are within the attracting range of x2.
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(iv) At p = 3, | fλ |= 3 and | 2 − fλ |= 1. Similar to (ii) above, the
intensity of positive feedback for each value of λ is an instability threshold,
located at fmax = 0.75, 0.60 and 0.50 when λ = 4, 5 and 6 respectively and
highlighted with dashed vertical lines in Figure 2.
(v) Finally, if p ∈ (3,∞) then | fλ |> 1 and | 2− fλ |> 1, so both fixed
points are unstable. At p ' 3.3, occuring at about f = 0.83, 0.65 and 0.54
in Panels A, B and C, the steady-state path displays a cascade of period-
doubling bifurcations (every period-2 attracting orbit splits into a period-4
attracting orbit and a period-2 repelling orbit). When the logistic paramer
is in the interval 3.45 < p ≤ 4 the dynamics begin to change very rapidly.
For p > 3.6 it can be shown that there are periodic points of all orders if a
period-3 periodic point exists.6
Finally, beyond p > 4 the dynamics of hf,λ become chaotic; the orbits
of xt are period-k for all k > 0 and display sensitive dependence to initial
conditions; see Appendix. It should be stressed that all market dynamics are
deterministic, i.e. endogenous. Tambakis (2006) extends the present model
with a stationary stochastic process driving the price impact coeﬃcient.
6 Financial (in)stability
6.1 Gaussian versus non-Gaussian returns
The distributional properties of returns impact upon fixed point stability.
If returns are standard normal, xt ∼ N(0, 1) so that σx = 1 and sx = 0,
autocorrelation inequalities (6) reduce to
− 1
λγ
≤ f ≤ 1
λγ
(16)
Given f ∈ (0, 1), the relevant inequality is fλγ ≤ 1 so investor uniformity
(positive feedback intensity) is bounded above by 1/λγ. From equation (14),
6The proof lies beyond the scope of this paper, for a sketch see Holmgren (1997). The
seminal paper on chaos in low-dimensional non-linear systems is Li and Yorke (1975).
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the two fixed points are on opposite sides of one: | h0f,λ(x1) |≤ 1 and |
h0f,λ(x
2) |≥ 1. The zero fixed point is then stable while the non-zero fixed
point is unstable. Hence, if returns are standard normal there is no feasible
combination of the trading parameters such that the non-zero fixed point is
stable. Put diﬀerently, xt ∼ N(0, 1) is a suﬃcient condition for zero expected
returns to be a stable steady state.
These observations suggest that the unstable logistic range of Section 5
(1 < p < 3, shown in Figure 1, Panel C) cannot arise unless returns are
non-Gaussian. The presence of skewness and/or excess kurtosis (fat tails)
is a necessary condition for p > 1. It is clearly not a suﬃcient condition,
as one can always select f and λ so that fλγ < 1 regardless of the returns
distribution. Thus, zero expected returns may be unstable only if the returns
pdf is non-Gaussian.
Further, setting γ = 1 and defining (pmin, pmax) to be an open interval
for p implies λ > pmin/f . As f < 1, it follows pmin is the minimum feasible
price impact. Note well that the converse does not hold: the upper bound
on liquidity (λ < pmax/f) is infinite as f can be arbitrarily close to zero.
6.2 Implications for financial regulators
For comparison purposes, fix the concentration of investor opinion to f and
consider a negative liquidity shock (positive shock to the price impact co-
eﬃcient). Figure 2, Panels A-C then indicate that the threshold level of
investor concentration at which the zero expected returns become unstable
increases in asset liquidity. Hence, trading in more liquid assets is stable
for a wider range of investor diversity than trading in less liquid assets. It
also follows that, if an asset suddenly becomes illiquid for exogenous reasons
(such that 1/λ falls), then investor opinion must become more diverse (so
1−f should rise) if zero expected returns are to remain stable. Equivalently,
the intensity of risk feedback must increase to compensate for the instability
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induced by the adverse liquidity movement. In the game-theoretic “popula-
tion” interpretation of investor diversity, there must be more risk feedback
traders to exert a compensating stabilizing influence on the dynamics. The
converse situation is also instructive. If herding behavior grips the market
and investor diversity drops sharply, then asset liquidity needs to increase
(the price impact coeﬃcient to fall) for zero expected returns to remain sta-
ble. This compensating function of asset liquidity and investor diversity is
apparent from comparing Figure 2, Panels A and C.
The progression of the two trading parameters from stability to instability
and chaos has clear implications for policy makers charged with maintain-
ing financial stability. Given the level of asset liquidity, if investor diversity
gets suﬃciently low the market dynamics will become unstable and progres-
sively turbulent and chaotic. The analysis also suggests that, depending on
the starting level of parameter values, very small perturbations in asset liq-
uidity and/or investor diversity can cause large jumps in expected returns.
Given pervasive uncertainty regarding investor diversity and positive feed-
back intensity–indeed, both could be said to be intractable, especially at
high-frequency–the model suggests policy makers’ responsibility should be
to ensure adequate liquidity, i.e. preventing the price impact coeﬃcient from
blowing up. The critical role of liquidity provision and stable market-making
is supported by recent arguments that asset liquidity can evaporate in tur-
bulent periods of market stress. Persaud (2001, 2003) and Taleb (1997) have
referred to such crisis episodes as liquidity black holes.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper I presented a nonlinear model of feedback trading at high fre-
quency. The dynamics of asset returns displayed stable or unstable behavior–
including the possibility of market turbulence and chaos–depending on the
diversity (heterogeneity) of investor opinion and the level of asset liquidity.
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There was no stochastic uncertainty or asymmetric information and all price
adjustment was deterministic, driven by last previous trading period’s actual
return and volatility. Potential applications of this framework include simu-
lating market dynamics using a stochastic liquidity parameter to explore the
relative likelihood of financial turbulence and chaos. Also, the comparative
static results relating autocorrelation to returns’ second and third moments
suggest the need to test for conditional skewness in high-frequency data. As-
sessing the presence of time-varying return asymmetries seems important for
understanding non-fundamental trading patterns. These extensions are the
subject of current research.
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APPENDIX
Fixed point existence and stability
Let h : I → I be a continuous function on I, where I = [a, b] is a closed
interval on R. Then point c is a fixed point of h if h(c) = c.
The point p is a periodic point of h with period k if hk(p) = p. Then p is
also a fixed point of hk, the k-iteration of h.
The point p is eventually periodic with period k if there exists N such
that fn+k(p) = fn(p) for all n ≥ N .
Fixed point c of continuous function h is stable (unstable) if all points
in the neighborhood of c approach (leave) the neighborhood under repeated
iteration of h. Let h : I → I be a continuously diﬀerentiable function, denote
its derivative at a ∈ I as h0(a), and let p be a periodic point of h with (prime)
period k. If | (hk)0(p) |< 1, then p is a stable (or attracting) fixed or periodic
point of h. If | (hk)0(p) |> 1 then p is an unstable (or repelling) fixed or
periodic point.
If | (hk)0(p) |6= 1 then p is a hyperbolic periodic point of hk, while if
| (hk)0(p) |= 1 then p is non-hyperbolic. Non-hyperbolic periodic points do
not have predictable behavior in any local neighborhood.
Let p be a periodic point of h with period k. The point x is forward
asymptotic to p if the sequence {x, hk(x), h2k(x), h3k(x), ...} converges to p,
that is if limn→∞ hnk(x) = p. The stable set of p, denoted W (p), is the set of
all points which are forward asymptotic to p.
Bifurcations and chaos
Let fc(x) be a parametric family of functions. There is a bifurcation at
c0 if there exists an ε > 0 such that, if a and b satisfy c0 − ε < α < c0 and
c0 < b < c0 + ε, then the dynamics of fa(x) are diﬀerent from the dynamics
of fb(x).
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Transcritical bifurcations occur when two hyperbolic periodic points merge
into a single non-hyperbolic fixed point.
Period-doubling bifurcations occur when a period-2k periodic orbit is
added to the orbit of a period-k periodic point. There are two more types of
bifurcation, saddle-point and pitchfork, which do not appear in the logistic
map.
Let D be a subset of a metric space with metric d. Function h : D → D
then exhibits sensitive dependence on initial conditions if there exists a δ > 0
such that, for any x ∈ D and any ε > 0, there is a y ∈ D and some number
n ∈ N such that d[x, y] < ε and d[hn(x), hn(y)] > δ. The function h : D→ D
is chaotic if it satisfies the following three conditions:
(a) the periodic points of h are dense in D,
(b) h is topologically transitive, and
(c) h displays sensitive dependence on initial conditions.
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